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Exit Exams and High School Dropout 
 
In this paper, I consider the impact of the expansion of exams students must pass in order to 
graduate high school on dropout rates. “Exit exams,” as these tests are known, have become 
more common, and more difficult. These exams are controversial, with opponents claiming 
they drive marginal students out of school, and proponents arguing they align student 
interests with those of the school and encourage teachers and administrators to provide effort 
and resources on the students’ behalf. I make use of the fact that when states implement exit 
exams, they first affect a specific graduating class. So in some states, some students in high 
school are required to pass these exams, while students in the grade above are not. Using a 
state-grade panel constructed from the Common Core of Data I find evidence that the recent 
expansion of exit exams has resulted in a modest increase in high school dropout rates in the 
aggregate, but a large increase among students in 12
th grade, where additional attempts to 
pass exams are not possible. I also find that a policy often used to limit the impacts of exit 
exams on high school completion has only limited effect: Dropout rates in states where 
students can earn a diploma or credential even when unable to pass exit exams, dropout 
increases in 12
th grade at about the same rate as in other states without such alternative 
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  Over the course of the past three decades, many advocates of education reform 
have sought to extend and enhance the role of accountability.  In part this has increased 
focus on the ability of schools and local and state education authorities to generate and 
sustain learning gains on the part of their students.  To a lesser degree, states have 
imposed expectations on students, and sanctions for failing to meet them.  A key form of 
student level accountability is the requirement for high school students to pass exit exams 
in order to receive a diploma.   
  In the 1970s, concern that high school diplomas were becoming poor indicators of 
graduates‟ abilities led many states to adopt minimum competency tests for high school 
students (Peterson and West, 2003; Pipho, 1978).  These tests lived up to their names, 
and were universally aligned to competency levels well below high school.  Even then, 
administrators and teachers found ways to limit the chances and consequences of poor 
performance.  For example, schools modified curricula, tutored poor performing students 
and provided pre-tests to boost performance (Walstad, 1984), and commonly re-tested 
failing students (Goldman, 1984).  In the subsequent decades, high school exit exams 
have become more challenging, and the consequences for poor performance more 
substantial.  
As the exams have moved beyond testing minimum competency, they have also 
become more widely used.  By 2008, students in 25 states were required to pass an exit 
exam to receive a diploma, with another planning to do so by 2012 (Center on Education 
Policy, 2008).  Currently, exit exams affect nearly 70 percent of students in public high 
schools in the U.S. (Center on Education Policy, 2008).     2 
   Proponents have advanced many arguments in favor of consequential tests for 
high school students.  These include providing motivation to students, aligning teacher 
and student interests, and making goals and expectations transparent (Bishop, 2001).  
There is also evidence that exit exams lead to efficiencies by encouraging instructional 
and pacing guidelines across schools that align to tested material (Zabala et al., 2007).  
But, opponents of exit exams raise the objection that imposing additional requirements 
will only lead to higher rates of failure and dropout for marginal students (Amrein and 
Berliner, 2002).  
  While these exams are widespread and expanding, the evidence on their impacts 
is not settled; either on the achievement the exams are intended to improve or on rates of 
dropout they are suspected of affecting.  In this paper, I attempt to add to what is known 
about the impact of high stakes exit exams on high school dropout, the measure of 
educational attainment most central to policy debates on this topic.  That the evidence on 
the impact of exit exams on dropout is not settled can be attributed to a variety of factors.  
Much of why the evidence remains unclear is due to the fact that exit exams aligned to 
the high school level are relatively new. The initial research on this question focused on 
state dropout rates subsequent to the adoption of exit exams during the 1980s and early 
1990s.  On balance, this evidence found some evidence (though mixed) of increased 
dropout rates, especially among student groups otherwise at higher risk of dropout.  
There has been little work done to assess whether state dropout rates have increased more 
substantially subsequent to the expansion and adoption of exit exams aligned at the high 
school level over the past decade.   3 
More recent evidence has used individual level data on students near the 
minimum passing score on exit exams in select states to identify the impact of failing an 
exit exam on high school completion. Evidence from these regression discontinuity (RD) 
studies generally finds no effect of exit exams on educational attainment. Comparing the 
findings of these RD studies with the earlier aggregate studies is difficult because of 
differences in the time periods and treatment margins under study. 
  In this study I contribute to our developing understanding of the impact of exit 
exams by updating and extending the analysis of their effects on dropout rates in states 
that adopt exit exams or make them more rigorous in the recent decade of increased 
accountability.  I focus on aggregate dropout rates because research is scant on how 
overall dropout rates have been affected by the more demanding exit exams implemented 
over the past decade.  Further, aggregate dropout rates are arguably a more important 
policy concern than treatment effects at the exam cutoff.  The barrier imposed by exit 
exams affects students far below the cut-off, who now confront an additional challenge to 
graduation.  As a policy matter, the impact of exit exams over the entire range of the 
ability distribution is relevant.   
To advance our understanding of the impact of exit exams on states‟ graduation 
rates, I expand the scope of analysis beyond what has previously been studied.  In 
particular, I make use of a complete national panel of all states from the early 1990s to 
the late 2000s, based on the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for 
Education Statistics.  This provides the most comprehensive and current assessment of 
the relationship between exit exams and high school dropout.  Just as importantly, using a 
later panel than has heretofore been available, I am able to focus principally on the advent   4 
of exit exams aligned to the high school level.  As I will discuss below, previous work 
has focused on exit exams which tested levels of competence often at the elementary or 
middle school level.  As one might expect, research on the effects of these minimum 
competency tests suggest that they have very little effect on outcomes for most students.  
The new push for exit exams has included a push to align the exams with high school 
levels of competence.  So, not only are more students required to pass these exams, but 
the exams are becoming more rigorous, and hence one might expect more substantial 
impacts. 
The paper is structured as follows. I first provide a brief history of high school 
exit exams in the United States.  In doing so, I discuss the mechanisms through which 
these exams might affect student performance, and review the available evidence linking 
these exams to dropout.  I then discuss the empirical approach and data I employ to 
estimate these pathways.  In the penultimate and final sections of the paper I present and 
then discuss results. 
Background: 
  Today‟s high school exit exams are a legacy of the one of the earliest reforms in 
what has become the accountability movement. In the early 1970s, critics of American 
education worried about a decline in the quality of schools in the U.S.  Much of this 
concern was fueled by business interests who complained that the skills possessed by 
graduates of American high schools were low, and falling. Their concern was that this put 
American business at a disadvantage in the global economy.
1  This anxiety led to what 
has been called the “first wave” of accountability reform in public schools: minimum 
                                                 
1 This concern was central to the 1981 “A Nation at Risk” report.   
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competency testing (Dee, 2003).   In the late 1970s, minimum competency tests were 
introduced in states across the country, assessing basic skills (Pipho, 1978).  These tests 
were usually criterion-referenced,  aligned to elementary or middle school levels (Jacob, 
2001),  and were more often used to identify low performing students for remediation 
than to serve as a bar above which all graduates must pass (Dee, 2003).   
However, over time these exams have become mandatory for students in many 
states.  Passing these exams is necessary to receive a diploma in 23 states, with three 
more planning to do so by 2012 (Center for Education Policy, 2008).  Currently, exit 
exams affect nearly 70 percent of students in public high schools in the U.S. (Center on 
Education Policy, 2008).   
   Exit exams have been the source of considerable controversy from the outset. A 
key criticism of has always been that these exams will induce marginal students to drop 
out of high school, with no good alternative.  The concern here is that by raising the cost 
of earning a high school diploma, one would expect that at the margin some students 
would decide that the time and effort now necessary to earn the high school degree was 
not an investment worth making (McDill, 1985). Other criticisms of exit exams include 
the concern that they result in “teaching to the test” or focus too much attention on the 
learning of marginal students at the expense of students whose academic performance is 
better (Airasian, 1987; Amrein and Berliner, 2002).  
  Proponents, on the other hand, point to a number of potential benefits of exit 
exams on student learning and attainment.  First, exit exams could provide incentives for 
schools to improve education.  Jacob (2001) suggests a number of mechanisms through 
which these tests could affect achievement, such as higher levels of teacher effort or   6 
improvements to the curriculum.  Jacob (2001) points out that a substantial body of 
literature in education, known as the “effective schools” literature, identifies a number of 
characteristics of schools that are most associated with academic success.  Typical of 
effective schools are clearly defined objectives, monitoring of students, and remediation 
for underperforming students (see Purkey and Smith (1985) for a summary). Exit exams 
essentially require all affected schools to adopt these characteristics.  Further, proponents 
argue that exit exams can improve learning outcomes and attainment by inducing effort 
and motivation on the part of students.  There is little direct empirical evidence on this.  
One relevant study is that of Roderick and Engel (2001), who examine the Chicago 
Public School‟s policy reform to end social promotion. Roderick and Engel study the 
response of low-performing 6
th to 8
th graders subsequent to the new policy which raises 
the stakes of tests and coursework by linking poor performance to grade retention.  
Roderick and Engel find that the students report (and teachers confirm) greater effort and 
attention in class and on assignments subsequent to the new policy.  Moreover, the 
behavioral response occurred generally, not as the result of having failed a high-stakes 
test.    
Evidence on the impact of exit exams on academic achievement is limited, and 
mixed. That the evidence is mixed is in part a result of the fact that these exams are a 
moving target.  The earliest papers to examine achievement effects were looking almost 
exclusively at minimum competency tests (i.e. tests aligned at grade school levels).  More 
recently, these exams have included tests aligned to high school levels.  More difficult 
exams are likely to have different effects on achievement.  A second reason that the 
results are mixed is that many of the earlier studies used cross-sectional or otherwise   7 
limited methods which make it difficult to distinguish the effects of exit exams from 
effects caused by other state-level changes (Dee and Jacob, 2007). 
The early evidence on minimum competency tests found that students in states 
with these tests had higher levels of achievement (Fredricksen, 1994; and Winfield, 
1990). These studies were often limited in their design, relying mainly on cross-sectional 
variation. The early evidence of effects of exit exams on dropout is similarly suggestive, 
but inconclusive.  Griffin and Heidorn (1996) find no impact of failure on minimum 
competency tests on dropout for marginal students, though they do find higher rates of 
dropout for better students.  Jacob (2001) similarly reports no overall impact of exit 
exams on dropout, but some evidence for of higher dropout rates for low ability students.  
Warren, Jenkins and Kulick (2006), however examine evidence from 1973 to 2000 and 
report that exit exams do lower graduation rates, on average.  
Much of the evidence on exit exams in recent years comes from research that 
exploits student-level data from individual states and regression-discontinuity designs to 
identify the effects of failing exit exams on students who score just below minimum 
passing scores. These studies generally find no impact of failing exit exams on dropout or 
high school completion. See, for example, Martorell‟s (2005) study using data from 
Texas, Ou‟s (2009) examination of New Jersey, and Reardon et al‟s (2009) study using 
data from four large districts in California.  One study of this type does find evidence that 
failure on a state‟s exit exams reduces the likelihood of graduating for low-income 
students from urban districts in Massachusetts (Papay et al. (2010)). 
Comparing the findings from recent RD studies with earlier work that relied on 
aggregate dropout rates is difficult both because the RD studies focus on a more recent   8 
period, and because the aggregate studies estimate effects on all students - not just on 
those near the minimum passing score on exit exams.  The impact of a requirement to 
pass exit exams likely has quite different effects on students at different parts of the 
achievement distribution. Students at the top are at very low risk for dropout, and an exit 
exam would likely have little or no effect on that risk. Drop out risk likely rises as one 
moves down the achievement distribution, but whether the marginal effect of the 
additional graduation requirement imposed by an exit exam is constant or decreasing in 
achievement is an empirical question.  Neither RD nor aggregate studies can answer this 
question, but both can give different answers if the effect of exit exams on dropout is not 
constant. Estimates from aggregate dropout rates are weighted averages of potentially 
heterogeneous local average treatment effects.  For the purposes of policy evaluation this 
is the important estimate, though, since any and all change in dropout subsequent to the 
imposition of exit exams is relevant for assessing full social costs.   
Evidence on the aggregate impact of exit exams during the No Child Left Behind 
period is scant. The evidence most directly related to the current paper is that of Dee and 
Jacobs (2007).  Using the Common Core of Data, they examine the impact of 
implementation of Minnesota‟s “Basic Skills Tests,” or BSTs.   Minnesota implemented a 
set of exit exams that, despite the name, as aligned at a level well above MCTs.  The first 
graduating class required to pass the BSTs was the class of 2000.  Dee and Jacob (2007) 
report that the BSTs reduced the likelihood of high school completion overall, but the 
effect is insignificant.  They find the effect varies by grade, with no significant effect for 
9
th graders, reductions in dropout rates for students in 10
th and 11
th grade, but an 
increased dropout rate in 12
th grade.   9 
The findings from Dee and Jacob‟s analysis of the effects of Minnesota‟s Basic 
Skills Test on dropout rates are obviously limited by the focus on one, relatively 
homogeneous state. But their work is similar in spirit and strategy to the analyses I 
conduct here.  Rather than focusing on the introduction of one state‟s tests on dropout 
using district level data, I use data for all states and exploit cross-state differences in the 
introduction of high school exit exams.   
  Data and Approach:   
In this paper, I seek to identify causal estimates of the impacts of these exams on 
aggregate dropout rates by examining their impact within states, comparing dropout rates 
in grades newly confronted with a mandatory exit exam to rates within the same state in 
grades not required to take an exit exam.  Because exit exams are phased in so that 
students in a specific graduating class are announced to be the first group required to pass 
the exam as a condition of graduation, as exit exams are implemented students in one 
grade are faced with a new requirement that does not affect students in the same state in 
the grade above.  By examining changes over time in dropout rates for students in states 
that implement exit exams, I control for underlying changes in educational systems and 
economies that might be related to both educational policies and dropout.  Further, by 
comparing changes in dropout rates for grades forced to take exams over and above 
changes for grades not required to pass the same exam, I limit threats to validity due to 
unmeasured changes over time in factors that would affect dropout that might be 
coincident with adoption of exit exams, since such changes would likely affect students 
in more than one grade.  Below, I describe both the data and strategy I use to develop 
these estimates.    10 
Data 
To examine the impact of exit exams on dropout rates I construct a state-year 
panel data set built on the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the 1992-93 to 2007-08.   
The CCD is a database collected and maintained by the U.S. Department of Education‟s 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  The data collected include information 
on the number and characteristics of students in all public elementary and secondary 
schools in the U.S.  The CCD includes a number of components, but I make use of the 
State Aggregate Nonfiscal Data component.
2 
The NCES collects CCD data from state education agencies (SEAs), and works 
with these agencies to develop common reporting definitions. Working with state SEAs, 
the NCES developed an “event” dropout definition which is used in the CCD (Stillwell, 
2010).  The CCD definition counts a student as a dropout if he or she had been enrolled 
in a particular year, but on October 1 of the next academic year the student had not 
enrolled, graduated, or met exclusion restrictions of transferring to another school, taking 
temporary absence due to illness, or death (Stillwell, 2010).   
There are various ways to measure dropout.  Event measures like the one used 
here are generally preferred to status measures determined by surveying samples from 
general populations and inquiring about their enrollment/school completion status 
(Warren, 2005).  Still, the CCD‟s measure fails to pick up subsequent re-enrollment of 
students who dropout in one year, only to return in a later year (Warren, 2005).  
However, because the CCD measure requires schools to substantiate reports of student 
transfer and withdraw, and it accommodates grade retention, it does not suffer from 
problems that have plagued studies of high school completion rate using ratios of 
                                                 
2 For more information on the CCD, see http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/index.asp.   11 
graduates to enrollment (Warren, 2005; Dee and Jacob, 2007).  For my purposes, another 
advantage of the CCD data is that it provides measures on grade-specific dropout rates.  
Since the introduction of exit exams affects some grades in a school, but not others, 
distinguishing between dropout rates by grade is an important aspect of identifying the 
impact of these tests. 
  To the CCD data, I first add state level measures of the presence and grade 
alignment of exit exams. I obtain these measures principally from data reported by the 
Center for Education Progress, which conducts regular surveys of all state SEAs on exit 
exams.  I have verified measures reported by CEP by comparing to Dee and Jacobs 
(2007) and have augmented some missing state/year data by contacting state SEAs 
directly.  From this, I generate two measures of exit exams: a binary indicator of whether 
a student in grade g in state s in year t was required to pass any exit exam as a condition 
of graduating; and, a separate indicator of whether a student in grade g in state s in year t 
was required to pass an exam aligned at the high school level as a condition of 
graduation.  Finally, I add measures of employment and income from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  
Empirical Model 
  Using the state-year panel built around the CCD, I estimate models that exploit 
within-state differences in the introduction of exit exams and/or changes in the level at 
which these exams were aligned.  I employ a model similar to Dee and Jacobs‟s (2007) 
work using district level data in Minnesota.  To examine the impact of exit exams on 
dropout rates, I make use of differences in the grades exposed to these exams within   12 
states.  First, I estimate the impact on dropout rates of exposure to exit exams, 
conditioning on state/year economic conditions and on state, grade and year fixed effects: 
 (1)  sgt t s g sgt st sgt E X D            
 
2 1  
Where Dsgt measures dropout rates in state s, grade g, in year t; Xst is a set of controls for 
labor market conditions in each state and year; Esgt measures whether students in grade g 
in state s and year t would be required to pass an exit exam to eventually graduate.  
In model 1, the impact of these exams is estimated via changes in exposure to 
exams for students in a grade and state, net of any general state influences on dropout, as 
well as any grade-specific factors common across states.  These might include general 
cohort or policy factors. A limitation of this specification is that it could confound any 
state-specific changes in education or cohort quality over time with the implementation of 
new exit exams.  For example, one threat to identification would arise if a decline in 
educational outcomes within a state spurred the implementation of an exit exam.  Since 
Model 1 controls only for general state effects, it cannot distinguish changes in a 
particular state‟s dropout rates across grades from changes due to the implementation of 
an exam.  So, any decline in education/cohort quality over time that would increase 
dropout rates for students in lower grades might appear to be policy effects, because 
exams affect students in lower grades first. 
 However, because of the way exit exams are instituted or modified, the exposure 
to exit exams varies by grades within a state in any year.  For example, Indiana adopted 
an exit exam, called the Graduation Qualifying Exam and aligned to high school levels in 
reading and math, for the class of 2000. Students in that class knew about the requirement 
before they entered high school.  However, students in the class of 1999 did not have to   13 
pass the exam.  So, beginning in 1997, 9
th graders in Indiana faced the prospect of a high 
school aligned exit exam, while students in 10
th grade and above did not. The next year 
(1998), 9
th and 10
th graders faced the GQE as a condition of graduation, 11
th and 12
th 
graders did not.  And, so on.    
To take advantage of this, I specify a second model that allows for unique grade 
effects within states, as well as state-year specific intercepts:  
(2)  sgt st sg sgt st sgt E X D          
 
2 1  
This strategy identifies effects of exit exams by comparing dropout rates for 
students in grades affected by the exams within a state, separate from the usual patterns 
of dropout observed for a particular grade in each state. Because Model 2 limits threats to 
identification that could arise if grade-specific dropout rates were changing within states 
in a way that was coincident with the implementation of exit exams, it is the preferred 
model here.   
Below, I estimate both models first where the outcome is the dropout rate for all 
students in a grade, state and year.  I then distinguish between dropout rates by gender 
and race. Because the distribution of dropout rates is bounded at zero and positively 
skewed, all models are in log-linear form.  The log-linear specification also makes 
comparison of relevant effects for different groups somewhat easier.  In any case, the 
findings below are not sensitive to the use of logs. 
Finally, because states differ in the level of alignment of their exit exams, and 
some states change the grade alignment of their exams, I distinguish between the effects 
of exit exams aligned at the high school level and those aligned at less than the high 
school level by including separate indicators for both types of exit exams.  All models are   14 
estimated using weighted least squares, with enrollment in state/grade/year as weights. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state-grade level. 
Results 
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics for the analytical sample.  There are a 
total of 2,850 state-year-grade observations in the panel.
3  Students in about a third 
(0.327) of those grades were required to pass some form of exit exam for graduation.  
About one-tenth (0.104) were required to pass the more challenging exit exams aligned at 
the high school level.  During the period, annual dropout rates were between 3.98 and 
5.77 percent, rising with grade.   
  As a first step to understanding overall patterns in high school dropout and exit 
exams, consider the time series in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 makes clear that dropout 
rates were falling for all student groups between the early 1990s and 2008.
4  On average, 
dropout rates fell from just under 6 percent of students to less than 4 percent by 2008.  
The decline was not even, remaining close to 6 percent until 1997, and then falling 
thereafter.  Similar inter-temporal patterns are apparent for students defined by race and 
gender, even if these groups differed in levels.
5  Black males had the highest rate of 
dropout, peaking at over 11 percent in 1996, and then falling to 6 percent by 2008.  At the 
same time, the dropout rate among white females fell from about 3 percent to under 2 
percent. 
  Figure 2 illustrates that over this period, the number of states with exit exams 
increased.  This increase appears relatively steady, beginning in the late 1990s.  The real 
                                                 
3 The panel consists of 16 years, 50 states, and 4 grades per state, but some states did not report graduation 
rates in all years.   
4 While Figure 2 shows dropout rates for 9
th grade students only, the same trends appear for all grades. 
5 I focus on white and black students exclusively because the number of students in relevant grades in other 
racial/ethnic groups in some less populous states is very small.    15 
story in Figure 2, however, is that the percent of states adopting tough exit exams 
(aligned to high school levels), rises slowly during the early part of the panel, and then 
increases markedly during latter part of the period.  So, in the aggregate, Figures 1 and 2 
make clear that the last two decades were a period of expanding exit exams and falling 
dropout rates. 
  In Table 2, I present estimates of the models of exposure to exit exams on dropout 
rates.  In columns (1) and (2) I present results from Model 1, above.  In columns (3) and 
(4) I add in state-grade as well as state-year fixed effects, the specification from Model 2, 
above.  In the odd numbered columns, I estimate models where the impact of exposure to 
exit exams on dropout is constrained to be equal across grades.  In the even numbered 
columns, I allow the effect to vary by grade.  The results of Model 1 are not consistent 
with any change in dropout risk subsequent to the adoption of exit exams.  Regardless of 
whether students faced exit exams aligned at the high school level or at levels lower than 
high school, there is no evidence in Model 1 of effects on dropout rates overall, or for any 
grade. In Model 2, however, the estimates of the effects of exit exams on dropout rates 
overall are positive, and significant at the conventional level for exit exams aligned at the 
high school level, and at the 10 percent level for exams aligned at grades below high 
school. 
 The differences between the results from Models 1 and 2 are interesting and 
suggest that the timing of states‟ decisions to adopt or strengthen exit exams is not 
independent of trends in dropout rates. Recall that Model 1 identifies the impact of exit 
exams by comparing changes in drop out rates in states changing their testing policies to 
changes in other states not making similar changes, while Model 2 identifies effects by   16 
comparing changes in dropout rates for students in a particular grade net of within-state 
grade specific trends.  That we find no effect of exit exams in Model 1, but positive and 
significant effects in Model 2 is consistent with a process of implementation of exit 
exams in state/grades where dropout rates are trending down, but a slight increase in 
dropout in those state/grades subsequent to the new testing regime. This might occur if 
states adopting these exams are also implementing other reforms that have positive 
impacts on outcomes, or are the states that feel least threatened by new requirements. 
Because Model 1 does not differentiate between the within grade general trends and 
policy effects, it confounds the effects of any policy that increased dropout during a 
period with any persistent general decline in dropout rates. 
  A second important lesson from the results presented in Table 2 is that regardless 
of the level at which an exit exam is aligned, the effect on dropout is driven entirely by 
increases in dropout among 12
th grade students.  The results in column 4 of Table 2, 
suggest that dropout rates of 12
th graders are more than a third higher than typical for 12
th 
graders in the same state in years where students were not required to pass exit exams.
6 
In Table 3, I re-estimate Model 2 separately for black and white students and for 
each of these groups for boys and girls separately.  In the first four columns, I present 
results for black students.  The second sets of columns present results for white students.  
The results in Table 3 suggest that exit exams have relatively large effects on the dropout 
behavior of white students.  Regardless of whether or not they are aligned at the high 
school level, exit exams are associated with an increase in dropout rates among white 
boys and girls in later grades, especially 12
th grade.  The coefficient estimates suggest 
                                                 
6 Taking exponents of the coefficients (0.31 and 0.41), dropout rates are 36.3% or 50.7% higher for 12
th 
grade students faced with exit exams, depending on the level of alignment of the exam.    17 
that regardless of the level of alignment, exit exams increase 12 grade dropout rates for 
these groups by about 50 percent.  For black students, high school aligned exit exams are 
associated with higher dropout rates in 12
th grade, significant for girls only, but the 
patterns at lower grades are much less clear.    
The effect for 12
th grade students is interesting, and the same as the pattern found 
by Dee and Jacob (2007) in Minnesota.  There are several potential explanations for this 
pattern.  The first is due to the way exams were implemented:  Students typically take 
exit exams early in their high school careers, and repeat them if an only if they fail.  
While failing an exam in 9
th or 10
th grade surely causes problems for students, the costs 
to poor performing students increase with grade as the consequences of failure rise while 
the opportunity for retesting diminishes.  An alternative explanation consistent with this 
pattern is that any alignment of incentives, focus on academic success, or targeting of 
instruction and remediation occur only in lower grades, while the anticipated behavioral 
responses on the part of students, teachers or schools may be abandoned after repeated 
signs of failure.  A final explanation is that the observed dropout of 12
th graders is 
precisely the intended consequence of failure of high stakes exit exams: the completion 
of high school without earning diploma because of a students‟ inability to demonstrate 
sufficient knowledge of tested subject matter. 
Unfortunately, the IPEDS data provides no ability to sort out the first two 
explanations.  There is, however, a way to gain insight into the importance of the third 
explanation; that relatively high dropout rates in 12
th grade are the intended consequence 
or at least a natural outcome of a meaningful exam, since all 12
th graders who leave high 
school without a diploma are counted among the dropouts.  While all states with exit   18 
exams make passing the exams mandatory for graduation in due course, they differ in 
whether there are “alternative pathways” to a high school credential for students who fail 
the exams. These alternative pathways are quite varied:  Some states permit students who 
cannot pass exit exams to take alternative exams; others permit substitution of 
satisfactory performance in selected courses or an end-of-course project (portfolio 
assessment) in place of the exit exam.  Or, states may permit students who have failed to 
pass exit exams to receive a credential other than a diploma, such as a certificate of 
achievement or completion (CEP, 2008).  Of the 25 states with exit exams in 2008, 19 
allowed some form of alternative pathway.   
In states with alternative pathways, even students who fail can complete high 
school with a diploma or some other certification of completion.  Dropouts in these states 
are students who have left school after 12
th grade having neither passed the exit exam, 
nor satisfied the alternative requirements for high school completion. Because passing an 
exit exam is not strictly required for graduation in these states, comparing changes in 
dropout rates in states with alternative pathways to changes in states without one can 
provide insight into how much of the impact of exit exams is due to the additional 
requirements placed on students prior to completing high school and how much is due to 
forced exit.  If the effect of exit exams was due to failing students finishing the school 
year but not being awarded a diploma, we would expect exit exams to little effect in 
states where alternative pathways are available.     
To examine whether the effects of exit exams vary in this way, I estimate models 
that distinguish between states with exit exams that provide alternative pathways to 
failing students, and states where passing exit exams is absolutely mandatory for students   19 
to graduate high school.  I present results from this estimation, in Table 4.   For 
parsimony, I do not distinguish between the level of alignment, and I present results only 
from the model which includes state-specific grade and time effects.  Further, I 
distinguish between effects in 12
th grade and all other grades, only.  The first three rows 
of Table 4 are estimates of the impact of exit exams in states that provide some form of 
alternative pathway to a high school credential.   Below these are estimates of dropout 
effects of exit exams in states where no alternative pathway is available.  I then present p-
values from hypotheses tests that the impacts on dropout rates in 12
th grade are the same 
in states with/without alternative pathways.  Again, I present these results separately by 
race/gender group.  
For all groups, high school exit exams increase high school dropout, regardless of 
whether students are offered alternative pathways to graduation.  For all groups, the 
impact of exams in states that offer alternative pathways is large and precisely estimated.  
In each case, the effect of exams in states with no alternative pathway is larger, but the 
estimates are less precise.  Consequently, in three of four cases, the impacts of exit exams 
in states with no alternative pathways is not significantly different than the impact in 
states were alternative pathways permit failing students to receive a diploma or certificate 
with additional work.  That exit exams have substantial effects on dropout, even when 
passing the exam is not mandatory, suggests that part of the mechanism operating here is 
the impact of additional hurdles to graduation increasing dropout among marginal 
students.  At the same time, there is suggestive evidence that effects are even larger if no 
alternative pathway is available, where failing students who have run out of options and 
time simply leave high school after twelve years with no diploma or certificate.   20 
  
Conclusions  
In this paper I have attempted to expand what is known about the impact of a new 
round of student level accountability on high school dropout, an outcome known to be 
associated with a wide variety of economic and social costs.  I find evidence that high 
school dropout rates rise with the implementation of exit exams, but modest overall.  I 
find that dropout rates increase mainly for students in the 12
th grade, the grade at which 
re-taking exams is no longer an option.  I find some evidence of differences for different 
groups, and clear evidence that effects are large regardless of whether or not states 
provide alternative pathways to receive a diploma or alternative credential for students 
that cannot pass exit exams.   
Overall, these results suggest that the recent expansion of exit exams has not 
resulted in an unambiguous increase in high school dropout rates.  Exit exams have led to 
higher dropout rates, in the aggregate, but that increase is concentrated on students in 12
th 
grade, where additional attempts to pass exams are not possible.  That impacts on dropout 
are not apparent until late in high school can provide some comfort to educators and 
policy makers concerned about that exit exams might limit educational attainment: 
Because exit exams affect dropout only at the end of high school, effects on attainment 
are at the margin and smaller than the decline in attainment we would expect if exit 
exams induced dropout early in high school. 
At the same time, the results here suggest that a widely used policy to limit the 
impacts of exit exams on high school completion has little effect on dropout:  In states 
where students can otherwise earn high school diplomas or other credentials even when   21 
unable to pass exit exams, dropout increases in 12
th grade at about the same rate as in 
other states without such alternative pathways.  Whether this should be of any concern to 
policy makers depends on the economic or social costs of the marginal increase in 12
th 
grade dropout rates in states with exit exams. Relevant to this assessment are the potential 
losses for students induced to leave high school a bit earlier than they might otherwise.  
There is good evidence that the value of an earned degree is large (Tyler et al, 2000), but 
it is not clear that estimates of these sheepskin effects apply to students at this margin.  
Other relevant considerations are the achievement gains which exit exams might 
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Table 1       Descriptive Statistics   
    Standard 
Variable  Mean  Deviation 
Employment (100,000s)  31.59  33.89 
Per Capita Income  27,846.67  7140.11 
Population (millions)  9.07  1.47 
Exit Exam (0/1)  0.335  0.472 
HS Aligned Exit Exam (0/1)  0.135  0.342 
9th grade - dropout rate  3.88  2.19 
10th grade - dropout rate  4.69  2.20 
11th grade - dropout rate  5.11  2.02 
12th grade - dropout rate  5.71  3.16 
Overall dropout rate  4.85  2.52 
Black female dropout rate  7.55  12.13 
Black male dropout rate  10.09  14.46 
White female dropout rate  3.11  1.76 
White male dropout rate  4.17  2.32 
     
n = 2,850     
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Table 2        Exit Exams and High School Dropout    
  Model 1  Model 2 
 Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exam   -0.03    0.10*   
  (0.07)    (0.06)   
Exam * grade 9    0.09    -0.04 
    (0.12)    (0.10) 
Exam * grade 10    -0.14    0.00 
    (0.11)    (0.11) 
Exam  * grade 11    -0.19*    0.12 
    (0.11)    (0.12) 
Exam * grade 12    -0.12    0.31** 
    (0.16)    (0.13) 
         
Exam (HS aligned)  -0.04    0.12**   
  (0.07)    (0.05)   
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 9    -0.03    -0.03 
    (0.12)    (0.13) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 10    -0.04    -0.02 
    (0.10)    (0.09) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 11    -0.07    0.11 
    (0.09)    (0.14) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 12    0.17    0.41** 
    (0.17)    (0.14) 
         
R-squared  0.553  0.562  0.875  0.879 
         
State, year and grade effects?  Yes  Yes  No  No 
State-year effects?  No  No  Yes   Yes  
State-grade effects?  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
All models control for employment, income, population, and fixed effects as 
described in text. Table 3    Exit Exams and High School Dropout: By Race and Gender  
Independent variable  Black Males  Black Females  White Males  White Females 
Exam   -0.31*    0.14    0.07    0.11*   
  (0.19)    (0.09)    (0.05)    (0.06)   
Exam * grade 9    -0.16    0.262    -0.17    -0.15 
    (0.22)    (0.17)    (0.13)    (0.14) 
Exam * grade 10    -0.17*    -0.301    0.13    0.15 
    (0.10)    (0.23)    (0.15)    (0.17) 
Exam  * grade 11    -0.18    -0.271    0.22    0.23 
    (0.11)    (0.19)    (0.16)    (0.18) 
Exam * grade 12    -0.19    -0.013    0.45**    0.48** 
    (0.17)    (0.20)    (0.17)    (0.20) 
                 
Exam (HS aligned)  -0.31*    0.15*    0.01    0.05   
  (0.17)    (0.087)    (0.04)    (0.04)   
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 9    -0.37*    0.232    -0.26**    -0.21 
    (0.21)    (0.17)    (0.13)    (0.14) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 10    0.03    -0.273    0.08    0.10 
    (0.14)    (0.21)    (0.14)    (0.15) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 11    0.01    -0.265    0.27*    0.24 
    (0.14)    (0.17)    (0.15)    (0.16) 
Exam (HS aligned)* grade 12    0.24    0.282    0.58**    0.56** 
    (0.19)    (0.18)    (0.16)    (0.18) 
R-squared  0.738  0.753  0.914  0.920  0.960  0.964  0.958  0.962 
State-year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-grade effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                  
** p<0.05   All models control for employment, income, population, and fixed effects as described in text. 
 Table 4    Exit Exams, Alternative Pathways and High School Dropout   
Independent variable  Black Males  Black Females  White Males  White Females 
Exam with Alt. Pathway  0.026    0.088    -0.046    -0.011   
  (0.099)    (0.078)    (0.071)    (0.068)   
 Exam  (w/ Alt)* grade <12    -0.038    0.058    -0.168*    -0.112 
    (0.137)    (0.120)    (0.095)    (0.094) 
Exam (w/ Alt)* grade 12    0.398**    0.274**    0.377**    0.351** 
    (0.081)    (0.089)    (0.057)    (0.047) 
                 
                 
Exam w/out Alt. Pathway  0.133    0.171    0.112*    0.154**   
  (0.103)    (0.113)    (0.058)    (0.055)   
Exam (No Alt.)* grade <12    -0.139    -0.146    -0.077    -0.026 
    (0.107)    (0.095)    (0.069)    (0.074) 
Exam (No Alt.)* grade 12    0.584*    0.700*    0.538**    0.614** 
    (0.352)    (0.376)    (0.119)    (0.125) 
                 
                 
Ho: Exam (w/ Alt)* grade 12 
=  Exam (No Alt.)* grade 12    p=0.608    p=0.271    p=0.226    p=0.050 
                 
R-squared  0.878  0.899  0.883  0.904  0.957  0.972  0.959  0.973 
State-year effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State-grade effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10;  ** p<0.05    All models control for employment, income, population, and fixed effects as described in text.   
 